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THE TAXATION OF "REAL PROFIT":
TOWARDS A LAISSEZ-FAIRE REVENUE CODE
Leslie C. Smith*
Paul E. Sullivan"
INTRODUCTION
Although the Internal Revenue Code began as a simple instru-
ment designed to raise monies for use by the federal government,
the passage of time has created a statute drastically changed in
nature. Pressure on the Congress by a multitude of groups with
vested interests, attempts by the legislators to promote "equity"
in the Code, and tax breaks for social or fiscal policy reasons have
wreaked havoc with the "simple" acts of bygone days. It is the
purpose of this article to point out several specific areas which are
in desperate need of modification or total elimination. However,
it is not only with these specifics we deal. Our cry is much broader
in scope; we intend to point out and explain how a revenue act
may be structured so as to tax "real" income-"real" profits-without
regard to social or fiscal policy, with the object being equal treat-
ment for virtually all taxpayers and fewer controls by our Treasury
Department over these policies.
In Part I of the article, after setting out the longstanding con-
gressional rationale upon which depreciation and capital gains taxa-
tion rests, we shall attempt to demonstrate how these areas of the
statute may be modified in order that "real" profit is reflected. In
these cases, "real" profit is defined as that amount of actual gain in
value of goods or services which accrues or is paid to the taxpayer,
taking into consideration the long term inflationary aspects of our
economy. Part II sets forth the reasons for departing from what
has long been considered "normal" tax policy and why a "simpler"
Code would result from this departure. Finally, several provisions
of the present Internal Revenue Code are examined with an attempt
*B.A., 1962, Vanderbilt University: J.D. (with high distinction),
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to point up why greater economies are achieved, and thus more
revenue raised through their actual elimination.'
PART I
I. DEPRECIATION
A. Evolution and Historical Development (Legislative History)
Accounting thought has long suggested that profit may only be
arrived at through recognition of a wearing and wasting away of
assets. The contra asset method of accounting evolved along tradi-
tional cost lines in that today it does not recognize replacement
costs or funding for purchase of new assets. Instead, accounting
principals today refer to the unexpired cost of plant assets and
shun any connotation of a decline in market value.
The question at once arises why such a specific and refined
science has eluded such concepts as replacement costs. There ap-
pears to be no suitable answer, but in recent years considerable
turbulence has occured in accounting circles over what the results
should be. The American Accounting Association Committee on
Concepts and Standards Underlying Corporate Financial Statements
in 1951 issued Supplementary Statement No. 2 dealing specifically
with replacement costs. In taking note of suggestions that current
or anticipated replacement costs of specific assets be used in measur-
ing the value of capital consumed, the committee observed that this
would represent a departure from recorded historical cost and
thereby would destroy (at least to a considerable degree) the
objectivity of accounting. The cost of consuming existing properties
must be recognized, the committee maintained, irrespective of the
intention to replace in kind, to replace with a different type of
property or not to replace at all. The committee, while rejecting
the idea of restating specific assets in terms of current cost, gave
full support to the preparation of supplementary statements in
which all items are adjusted for the changes in the value of the
dollar.
More recently, the American Institute of Certified Public Ac-
countants' Accounting Principles Board authorized a research pro-
ject by the Staff of the Accounting Research Division to study the
effects of price-level changes on accounting reports. The research
findings were subsequently published in 1963 as Accounting Re-
search Study No. 6. This study concluded that:
1 V. TANZI, THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX AND EcONOMIc GROWTH (1969),
provides an interesting analysis of the general principles of taxation
in our economy.
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The effect of price-level changes should be disclosed as a supple-
ment to a conventional statement. In the supplementary data, all
elements of the financial statements should be restated by means
of a single index of the general price level as of the balance sheet
date, so that all the financial data will be expressed in terms of
dollars of the same purchasing power.
Thus, it seems that accounting science has begun to reflect more
accurately the method of income reporting, which has undoubtedly
been appreciated by management. In addition to informing man-
agement of where the business stands financially (Net Worth),
price level accounting has introduced what might be termed the
real profit.
Real profit accounting has not developed at all in the tax struc-
ture, although it has at least been suggested through connotation
upon a number of occasions. The legislative history of depreciation
indicates a trend of events quite the reverse from accounting his-
tory. In the tax law history, replacement costs were first recognized,
and then by more definative refinement, the theory was lost in a
maze of new tax legislation, never again to be found. Perhaps the
best way to illustrate the evolution of depreciation in the tax law
is to briefly describe it.
The concept of depreciation was first introduced in the 1913
Revenue Act, Section II(B): "A reasonable allowance for the ex-
haustion, wear and tear of property arising out of its use or
employment in the business shall be allowed as a deduction in
computing net income for the purpose of the normal tax." This
wording does not indicate what was meant by the term "reasonable
allowance," but the term "net income" connotes the desire of the
legislature to tax on the basis of real and accurate net profit. In
the congressional discussions it was noted that this allowance was
another effort, of course, to maintain the capital intact.2
In 1918, Congress added to the depreciation allowance deduction
(i.e., a reasonable allowance for obsolescence) but left untouched
any further refinement of the original act. But in the 1934 Revenue
Act, concern shifted to cut down on excessible depreciation deduc-
tions via new legislation. It was proposed that allowances be re-
duced by twenty-five percent in subsequent years. Tlthough the at-
tempt failed, some interesting comments were made in the commit-
tee reports. For example, the Ways and Means Sub-Committee
stated in its report: "[I]t must be remembered that these amounts
2 50 CONG. REcoRD 3847 (1913) (remarks of Senator Cummins).
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deducted from income do not represent cash outgo like wages, re-
pairs, and similar expenses, but are annual reserves generally theo-
retically set aside to replace plant and property investment."3
Could this statement indicate that Congress was cognizant of
the real and only significant purpose of a depreciation allowance?
At least it appears it understood the concept of replacement cost,
which was further illustrated in a dissenting report by this same
Sub-Committee:
What is the object of an annual depreciation allowance? Mani-
festly, to build up by such annual allowances a fund to replace
the property at the end of its service life. Such annual allowances
constitute a fund which increases from year to year not only by
the amounts of the allowances themselves, but also by the normal
interest earnings of the fund.4
Although the Sub-Committee was concerned with annual interest
growth of the hypothetical depreciation fund, which is not the
present issue in this paper, it is indicative of the fact that some
constructive reflection on replacement cost transpired. -
Review of the legislative history of the depreciation provisions
indicates that no direct comprehensive study has ever been made
of the effects of inflation on depreciation replacement funds. How-
ever, early in the 1950's businessmen began to complain about un-
realistically long service lives embodied in depreciation formulas,
some of which dated back to the 1920's. They argued that tech-
nological change called for accelerated obsolescence. Thus, the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 allowed business to employ either of
two methods of accelerating depreciation on new assets. Double
declining-balance and sum-of-the-years digit methods evolved, and
to a limited extent, they provided a short-term stop gap for the
overstatement of real profit. Since these methods were not designed
to offset inflation, they served only to prevent overstatement of
corporate profits in the early 1960's. However, since they do not
increase the total write-off, their helpfulness was quite limited.
Notwithstanding the fact that the 1954 depreciation changes
offered some relief in reducing the corporation's dilemma, the
Treasury Department in the 1969 Reform Act saw fit not to increase
write-offs as was certainly indicated, but rather to significantly
limit accelerated depreciation on new investment. By reducing the
maximum write-off on new non-residential property (plant facili-
ties, etc.) to 150 percent of the straight line method, it was claimed
s H.R. REP. No. 704, pt. 1, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1934).
4 H.R. REP. No. 704, pt. 2, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1934).
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that there was to be $1.2 billion increase in revenues. Of course,
this increase did not reflect the lost taxes resulting from a slow-
down in corporate expansion and resultant lost future profits.
Whatever the reason the Treasury had for its chosen action, it
will certainly take its toll. Perhaps the government hoped to throw
large corporations into bankruptcy so that there could be more
serious consideration of government ownership of free enterprise,
such as is going on now over the Penn Central failure. In a more
serious vein, it is likely that the mathematics required to facilitate
this method of assets revaluation would be too speculative and
evasive. Moreover, there has not always been a variety of price
level indices from which to select. Recently, proper and more ad-
vanced information gathering has led to highly accurate indices
such as the Consumer Price Index and the Wholesale Price Index.5
Regardless of the reasons for the failure to cope with this prob-
lem in the past, there does not seem to be any foundation for its
neglect today. In the estate tax laws, mathematics in the form of
present value annuity computations have evolved to reflect present
worth of future earnings. Further, the depreciation computations
of our present law are at least as complex as well as speculative.
Whether one speaks of amortization of costs or depreciation or
depletion, a certain degree of inaccuracy and prediction is inevitable.
Hence, there appears to be no formidable argument for the continu-
ation of an unrealistic method of income reporting by failure to
recognize a true depreciation expense.
B. Criticism
The historical cost disbursement method of depreciation has cre-
ated gross overstatements of income for most companies resulting
in the overpayment of taxes. This point was recognized by the
Supreme Court of the United States as early as 1909 in the decision
of City of Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co. 6 It has even been sug-
gested that many corporations have failed due to poor planning and
heavy tax burdens which were conditioned by an erroneous method
of accounting for the wasting away of assets employed for the pro-
duction of income. A number of eminent academicians have ad-
5 For an interesting analysis of the accounting principles involved when
price indices are employed, see H. SIoNs & W. KARRENBROCK, INTWr-
MEDIATE AccouNTING (4th ed. 1964).6 212 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1909). "[A company] is entitled to see that from
earnings the value of the property invested is kept unimpaired, so
that at the end of any given term of years the original investment
remains as it was at the beginning."
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dressed their talents to the subject of true profits, notably Professor
George Stegler of the University of Chicago and Professor Soloman
Fabricant of New York University, member of the Board of Direc-
tors of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
Professor Fabricant, in a paper entitled Inflation and the Lag in
Accounting Practice, adjusted and restated profits not only for in-
sufficient depreciation but for rises in the general price level. He
argues that: "No labor union fails to mention the consumer price
index when engaged in a labor negotiation. Yet companies may
report record profits and say nothing about the contributions of an
attenuated dollar to these record highs.... Accounting practice has
not yet been adjusted to the fact of inflation."7
From the corporate kingdom one hears the pleadings of George
Terborgh, retiring director of the Machine and Allied Products In-
stitute. He argues that the difficulty with historical cost write-off
as a method of depreciation is that it makes no allowance for
inflation which raises the cost of replacing the asset without, of
course, raising the depreciation set aside for it. Resulting from this
oversight, United States business over the years has underdepreci-
ated its assets, overstated its profits and paid income taxes on this
overstatement. The chart in Appendix B, based on calculations by
Mr. Terborgh, shows the difference in profits as reported by the
Commerce Department since 1945 and profits adjusted for insuffi-
cient depreciation and inflated inventory values. Over those years,
by this reckoning, the cumulative overstatement of profits has
amounted to approximately $130 billion, on which business has
paid taxes of nearly $60 billion. Because of the severe current infla-
tion, adjusted profits have been declining steeply since 1966, and the
recent overstatements have been large-$11 billion in 1969, and an
estimated $12 to $13 billion in 1970. And when adjusted profits are
expressed in constant 1946 dollars, they are back down to the levels
of ten to fifteen years ago.
Finally, a comparison of depreciation deductions, and their tax
treatment, with countries abroad sheds some very interesting light
on this theme. A study has been prepared by the Treasury Depart-
ment showing a comparison of depreciation policies between the
United States and nine major industrial nations, before and after
the new guidelines for services lives and the now terminated invest-
ment credit became effective in 1962. The results appear in Ap-
pendix A.
7 Burak, The Hard Road Back to Profitability, FORTuNE, August 1970,
at 101.
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It might be noted that the table indicates that the United States
has the least liberal depreciation deduction even after 1962. And
taking away the investment credit and some accelerated deprecia-
tion allowances, as was accomplished by the 1969 Tax Reform Act,
would more than slightly amplify this situation. The reasons for
the larger deductions in other countries, such as France, is to
permit revaluations and special allowances to adjust for higher
replacement costs.8
C. The Proposed Statutory Changes Reflecting Inflation
Obviously when one attempts to account for inflation in analyz-
ing a wearing or wasting away allowance, he must talk in terms
of replacement costs. That is to say that a businessman when arriv-
ing at a true net profit should seek actual dilution in value of his
assets. Today very little has been accomplished in this area except
for the accelerated methods of depreciation and additional first
year allowances."
Granting the argument that some effort has been made is not
sufficient to make out a case for no change. This is similar to other
sections of the Code where we have lost sight of taxing real income
and instead have created a maze of complicated tax mechanics
alleged to make a stab at equal and fair taxation to all. However,
most government theoreticians are quick to argue their catch-all
defense: To change depreciation allowances to reflect inflation is
much too complicated and, more importantly, too speculative and
precarious to offer any intelligent basis for arriving at true income.
The problem of inflation or price changes as affecting the
corporate and business worlds is best exemplified in the following
example. Suppose that a businessman purchased new manufactur-
ing equipment for $300,000 and formed a corporation in pursuit of
8 The Tax Foundation has completed an excellent study concerning the
effects of depreciation on inflation in DEmCIATION ALLowANcEs:
FEDERAL TAx POLICY AND SOME EcoNoiviic ASPECTS (1970). However,
it must be noted that the Foundation is limited in its ability to influence
legislation in this area because of the danger of its tax-exempt status
being removed, especially under the new restrictions imposed under the
1969 Tax Reform Act.
9 Certain inroads toward recognition of inflationary trends when con-
sidering depreciation have been made in specialized areas, primarily
through efforts of the public utilities to obtain consideration of infla-
tionary effects in arriving at actual profits for the purpose of price
regulation. See Clarence H. Ross, Inflation as an Element in Determin-
ing Depreciation, N.Y.U. 16TH INST. ON FED. TAX 828 (1958). Also for an
indepth discussion of public utilities depreciation as affected by in-
fiation see Brickly, Inflation Factor in Utility Depreciation, 72 PUB.
UTI. FORT., Dec. 19, 1963, at 19.
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profit. The equipment is set up on the tax books and depreciated
over a period of twelve years to a salvage of $60,000 or twenty per-
cent of cost. Each year the corporation could get a depreciation ex-
pense of $20,000 in figuring its taxable income (using the straight
line method). The corporation operated for twelve years showing
an average of $40,000 taxable income per year. Each year the corpo-
ration would show a cash flow (taxable profit plus depreciation) of
$60,000. The tax paid on $40,000 would be $12,700 (twenty-two per-
cent on first $25,000 and forty-eight percent on the excess). Multi-
plying $12,700 by twelve years will give the total taxes paid for the
period of $152,400.
Therefore, at the end of twelve years of operation, the corpora-
tion's financial structure has changed as noted in the following
balance sheets.
BALANCE SHEET #1 (Initial)
Assets:
Cash in Bank -0-
Equipment 300,0001
Liabilities: 
-0-
Capital:
Capital Stock 300,000
BALANCE SHEET #2 (After twelve years)
Assets:
Cash in Bank 567,6002
Equipment 60,000 s
Total Assets $627,600
Liabilities: 
-0-
Capital:
Capital Stock 300,000
Retained Earnings 327,6004
Total Capital $627,600
FOOTNOTES TO BALANCE SHEETS:
1 At cost
2 Computer by multiplying the cash flow 60,000 x twelve years and then
subtracting total tax paid of $152,400.
s Accumulated depreciation of 240,000 was subtracted.
4Computed by subtracting from the annual taxable profit ($40,000) the
annual tax paid of $12,700 and multiplying by twelve years.
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Analyzing the change in balance sheets that took place over the
twelve year span, it becomes apparent that the corporation was
profitable and the net worth has more than doubled. But what
happens when inflation becomes a mathematical variable? To inter-
ject this variable into our analysis, we must think in terms of
replacement costs. Replacement cost of old equipment changes
from year to year affected principally by inflation. Thus the equip-
ment purchased for $300,000 twelve years ago can be expected to
cost considerably more today. In our previous hypothetical, if we
were to assume an average of five percent inflation per year, an
estimate of replacement cost could be calculated.
Equipment Replacement Cost= (1.05)12 x 300,000
=1.796 x 300,000
=$538,800
The replacement cost of $538,800 indicates that the corporation's
seemingly good financial condition is somewhat impaired. Func-
tionally speaking, in order for the corporation to get back in the
same position in which it started, it would have to purchase new
equipment for $538,800, trading the old equipment worth $60,000
and paying cash of $478,800. This transaction would leave the
corporation with $88,800 in the bank. Thus, in conclusion, we could
say that the corporation operated twelve years to accumulate
$88,800, which works out to $7,400 per year. Such a return factor
for a $300,000 investment (approximately two percent annual re-
turn) is hardly significant.
Some theoreticians argue that taxes are paid on personal earnings
(wages) which of necessity reflect a certain degree of inflation and
for this reason, it is inherently unfair to give the businessman this
advantage. However, this argument loses its effectiveness when one
considers that wages and other personal earnings are completely
taxable, whereas in the business context we are trying to arrive at
real earnings or self-betterment. What is really at issue is the
fairness of taxing an entity on something labeled as income which
in reality is capital. In the previous example, it was suggested that
the hypothetical corporation operated twelve years and wound up
with the same equipment (after replacement) and $88,800 cash in
the bank. The Treasury says this corporation made $480,000 or
$327,600 after taxes. How can this be true? The corporation ends up
where it started with an additional $88,800 of cash. Obviously the
difference between what the Treasury calls profit after taxes
($327,600) and what we suggest is real profit ($88,800) is the infla-
tion on equipment ($238,800).
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The problem seems to be reduced to the question of: Where did
the glamorous profits go? There are apparently two methods of
dealing with this problem in the tax law, once it has been recog-
nized. First we may do away with taxation on corporations and
other business entities as has been suggested by many commentators
throughout the years. No doubt there would be desirable economies
to be gained with this idea. The principal here would be to tax
the shareholder when he gets the profits via dividends and other
distributions. Code sections such as Section 531 (Accumulated
Earnings Tax) which are imposed to prevent abuse of the corporate
entity would have to be retained. Most corporate sections would be
eliminated and substituted with far less complicated shareholder
taxation provisions. This might eliminate a great deal of the often
unnecessary confusion and technicality in the Code, which could be
reflected in less governmental administration cost and save the
taxpayer considerable cost (high-priced tax experts). Perhaps this
increased efficiency on both sides and greater working capital would
manifest itself in the form of greater industrial growth resulting in
more individual tax revenues to offset lost corporate revenues. Since
corporate taxation only accounts for approximately 20 percent of
total tax revenues, there would be a great shift in tax burden to
another economic area.
The second proposed method is to tax corporate net profits after
deducting inflation. In the area of depreciation this could be ac-
complished by increasing the basis annually in an amount sufficient
to show increases in the replacement costs due to price increase.
The deduction would be computed by use of the current tax
methods: straight-line method, double declining balance, declining
balance, and sum-of-years digit. Retention of accelerated methods
is necessary to reflect obsolescence and early loss of value and not
to aid against inflation.
To illustrate the effect of computing depreciation in this manner
the previous hypothetical can be used. The corporation was utilizing
the straight-line method, and we will follow suit in this illustration.
Under our present tax treatment of depreciation we compute an
annual straight line depreciation by use of the formula:
Annual depreciation=Asset basis (cost less salvage)
Depreciable life (no. of years)
The proposed change in this formula is the addition of the inflation
factor.
Annual depreciation=
(Asset basis) X (1 + Annual inflation percentage)
Depreciable life
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In order to study the behavior of the above suggested formula
change and to apply it to a hypothetical situation, a new formula
must be derived to indicate the total depreciation to be taken over
the life of the asset. This is easily accomplished with the use of
series calculus. The following index will simplify the mathematics:
T.D.=total depreciation to be taken over the life of the asset
A =depreciable cost basis of the asset less salvage value
N =depreciable life in years
i average annual inflation
The derivation of a formula for total depreciation would work like
this: 10
TD (1 + i) 'A + (I + i) 2A + (1 + i) 3A + .. (1+ i) NA
* N, N 2  N, NN
Note that there is a relationship between each year in the form of
an increase power of (1 + i); thus by multiplying both sides of
our equation by (I + i) we can subtract the two equals giving us
our new formula.
TD (1 +] i) 1A + (1 + i) 2A + (1 + i) A +..(I + i) NA
* N, N2  N3  NN
Minus:
((I + -+i) 2 A+ (li)sA--... + (1+i)NA -(l+i)N+lA
(I+i)T.D.= N2  N, NN NN
Leaving: -iT.D.= = (l+i)A (1+i)N+AN N
Or: T.D.- (1 + i) A- (1 +i) N+'A
-iN
Applying the above formula to our previous hypothetical corpora-
tion's depreciation situation gives the following result if we assume
5 percent average annual inflation over the 12 year period.
T.D. - (1.05) 240,000 - (1.05)13 240,000
-(.05)12
252,000 - 452,640
- .60
= $334,400
10 As pointed out immediately above, depreciation for one year is
(l+c) A, thus in order to arrive at total depreciation the depreciation
N
allowed or allowable each and every year of the asset's life must be
added together. For example, N3 represents the third year of the
depreciable life of the asset.
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Note that over the period of twelve years the corporation now
gets a straight line depreciation deduction of $334,400 as opposed to
the $240,000 currently allowable. Moreover, what appears to be
frightening at first is the fact that new depreciation would allow
$34,400 more depreciation than the asset actually cost." This, as
pointed out before, is of no significance as far as the tax law is con-
cerned, although it might present some accounting problems. As in-
dicated in the previous formula, the taxpayer would receive an addi-
tional depreciation deduction of $94,400 and thus a tax savings of
$45,312 (at the forty-eight percent tax rate) which would be directly
reflected in the form of working capital for the corporation. In this
hypothetical the corporation's working capital would be increased
from $88,800 to $134,112 for a fifty-one percent increase. This is a
substantial increase and would help corporations expand and pro-
vide for necessary immediate investment such as pollution control
equipment (see our discussion in Part II, infra.).
The inflation approach of arriving at a fair and accurate calcu-
lation of expiration of capital investment seems to be the only
rational way to handle this problem if we are to maintain a corpo-
rate income tax system. But it is understandable that this concept
of depreciating in excess of cost basis will be difficult to sell to the
public (voter). This is especially true today when the emphasis is
on individuals as opposed to institutions, thus giving rise to con-
tinuous public attack on large concentrations of capital and hence
power. Politicians can run on platforms that demand greater taxa-
tion on business and less on individuals and gain widespread support
from the working class. This is probably true because it is a difficult
concept for people to grasp that it is this very concentration of
wealth and specialization of process that has led to the high standard
of living this country enjoys today. How can the individual be
expected to believe that a lessening of institutional income taxation
will indirectly effect an increase in individual wealth? Herein lies
the problem in developing an accurate income tax base on real
business profits. Thus, through elimination of fiscal and social policy
from the structure of taxation, which inevitably provides food for
untrained political minds, we have insured that there will be a more
fair and comprehensive tax basis.
1 But an even greater shock to orthodox minds will be the effect during
a deflationary period. In order to maintain the same real profit thesis,
we find that depreciation allowances will be decreased, instead of
increased as in the case of inflationary periods. As an example, suppose
one purchases a machine with a service life of five years and suffers
10% deflation the first year. Under present law for straight line depre-
ciation, 20% could be written off the first year. However, the "real
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II. CAPITAL GAIN TAXATION
A. Introduction-Evolution & Historical Development (Legislative
History)
The capital gains method of taxing a casual sale of property has
long been recognized in the federal income tax system. The Revenue
Act of 1921 initiated a policy of long term capital gains at preferen-
tial tax rates. Although this addition to the tax system was said to
have a policy of encouraging taxpayers to make sales of their capital
investments, it has never been fully articulated by Congress. One
of the theories most frequently enunciated is that the lower rates
on capital gains avoid the harsh effects of bunching of income in
the year of realization.
This concept of preferential tax treatment has spread throughout
the federal tax code structure in the form of legislative safeguards
and other forms of public policies. In effect, today's tax law (and
especially tax planning) is structured around the concept of capital
gain taxation. The never-ending conflict between ordinary income
tax treatment and capital gains treatment has provided much judi-
cial processing of an already voluminous amount of tax legistlation.
It could be said that capital gains involve more complex Code sec-
tions than any other tax device.12
B. Criticism
The taxpayer has both profited and suffered due to capital gains
taxation. This is best analyzed by breaking taxpayers into two
groups, each of whom have unrelated and dissimilar tax personali-
ties.
The first group consists of the investment speculators who are
motivated by the pursuit of profit. These persons usually have con-
siderable wealth and credit which constitute the tools with which to
better their economic status. It is apparent that they have prospered
by the advent of capital gains taxation in that the Code has evolved
into a network of complicated puzzles, the solution of which rewards
the careful investment speculator with generally at least a fifty per-
profit" method would necessitate a 10% reduction in the basis in order
to reflect deflation before taking the 20% pro rata writeoff. The end
result in this example is an 18% (20% x 100%-10%) depreciation de-
duction the first year which is a 2% decrease from methods currently
employed.
12 In order to realize the full significance in dollar amounts of revenues
derived from capital gains taxation see U. S. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
STATISTICS OF INCOME (1966).
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cent reduction in his tax burden.13 (The maximum tax on corpora-
tions will not exceed thirty percent for taxable years beginning in
1971, which is less than a fifty percent reduction.14)
Speculation has been condemned by many economists and other
theoreticians as being non-productive and providing no service to
society. It is reasoned that the speculator merely makes profit in
the transfer of goods and resources to the eventual consumer while
adding nothing to their value. Yet, the federal tax system has seen
fit to reward this type of conduct by providing a tax incentive under
the guise of relief for the bunching effect. The 1969 Tax Reform
Act, however, has eliminated this problem to a considerable extent
with the change in the income averaging section. 15 Now capital
gains qualify for income averaging. Although one can only spread
income over a five year period, this is surely adequate relief against
income grouping, if you take into account the deferral of periodic
tax payments on annual growth enjoyed by the investor.
On the other side of the coin is the non-speculative investor who
finds himself paying capital gains tax on necessary conversions
of property. The homeowner is perhaps the best example of this
group although taxpayers involved in involuntary conversions are
similarly representative (See discussion in Part II, infra). The ex-
ample of the homeowner demonstrates just how inequity may
result in the tax law when policy becomes too involved in the
process of revenue acquisition.
Let us take, for instance, the taxpayer who elects to sell his
home and retire at the age of fifty. (At the age of sixty-five no gain
would result under certain situations as provided in section 121.)11>
If he does not reinvest the sale proceeds in another residence within
a period of one year,17 he will be subject to capital gains taxation.
This may at first appear to be valid on its face, since he did receive
more money than he originally paid out for it. But if one looks at
the overall picture, he will most likely discover that this taxpayer
has in reality lost wealth instead of gaining it. This would be true
because of the effects of inflation or the decline in the value of the
dollar. If one can validly argue that monetary gains resulting from
inflation are real profits, then surely if there is to be a devaluation
33 See INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, §§ 1201 et seq. (hereinafter cited as 1954
CODE].
14 1954 CODE § 1201.
15 1954 CODE §§ 1301-05.
16 1954 CODE § 121.
-7 1954 CODE § 1034.
272 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 51, NO. 2 (1971)
of the dollar, everyone would realize gains on their properties. In
other words, there is some congruency between the effect of inflation
and the effect of a dollar devaluation. Both are products of the
monetary system, and to a certain extent, within the control of the
government. However, not many experts argue that devaluation
constitutes realized gain which should be taxed.
By recognizing the principle that change in net worth or aug-
mentation of net worth is real income, it is easy to conclude that
inflation is not income. If one's property doubles in value, but
everything else that is useable or consumable doubles in cost in the
same period of time, has one made a profit? Surely not, since his
property could not be traded for more goods or services at the end
of the holding period than at its inception. His net worth has not
changed, relatively speaking, since it commands no greater exchange
rate. The confusing factor is use of a medium of exchange to facili-
tate exchange of goods and services. If all records were kept in
terms of items of property, services, etc., there would be no issue
involving inflation for which to argue. The only concern we would
have in determining real gain would be to study relative exchange
rate shifts.
An inherent inequity 8 might be argued if inflation were not to
be taken into account on all types of investments. Thus in the
case of a security (stock) purchased for $2,000 and sold for $3,000,
(let us suppose the value of money has fallen by a third during the
time the security was held), it is probable that the whole proceeds
will be needed to re-invest in securities of similar standing. Now,
if the arguments for subtracting inflation out are to prevail, then
it is apparent that the security holder would be given preferential
treatment over other groups of taxpayers. Thus, a person who in-
vests $2,000 in securities in the above example would gain over the
person who invests $2,000 in debentures, savings accounts or bonds.
Both have suffered from inflation, it might be argued, and equity
demands either that both be compensated or that neither be.
These arguments appear insurmountable at first glance, but
further consideration helps to throw more light on the situation.
First, it must be recognized that the two types of investment are
inherently different. Stocks are by nature more speculative and thus
offer the reward of capital growth (not just inflationary but also
"real" growth) in addition to devidends. Also, the capital growth,
18 These inequities are noted in Hockly, Capital Gains and Inflation,
1968 BRTrsH TAX REv. 3.
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as a part of the income from stocks, remains tied up until the stock
is sold. By the nature of the investment there is a forced reinvest-
ment, thus the stock investor has lost the use of the earnings until
conversion.
C. Proposed Remedy for Inflation and Gains
Criticism of the present tax laws is easy to come by, for there
are endless and needless technical provisions which serve only as
vehicles for governmental policy. But agreeing that wrongs exist,.
such as the inequity of capital gains provision, what solutions are
available? 19 The best approach is to eliminate social and fiscal policy
from consideration and think only in terms of realistic gains. In
order to determine whether a real profit was made in a certain
property sale, inflation must be subtracted. This may be accom-
plished with a reasonable degree of accuracy by the use of mathe-
matics. Once the net gain has been derived, it would be taxed at
ordinary income tax rates.
In order to analyze the impact of this proposed change in our
income tax structure, it is necessary to reduce theory to mathe-
matics.20 In order to compare and contrast present law with the
proposed law, the formula for each must be derived.
Index Legend
x=Net consumable profits after taxes
r=Investment rate of return per annum (percentage)
p=Investment principal
f=inflation (average annual percentage)
t==.Tax rate
n=Number of years invested
The formula for our present tax treatment of capital gains,
assuming a given investment percentage of return and tax rate and
holding period in years, is developed below using the index above.21
x [1-T/2] [p (r) + p(r) (I-+-r) I-+- . . . +p(r) (I + r - 1]
19 Several related solutions are discussed in Slitor, The Carter Proposals
on Capital Gains: Economic Effects and Policy Implications for the
United States, 22 NAT. TAx J. 66 (1969), and Hockly, Capital Gains and
Inflation, 1968 BRI SH TAx REv. 3.
20 The mathematical analysis used herein is for the purpose of developing
the effects on tax revenue. This is not to be confused with economic
forecasting in the sense of economic growth development as empha-
sized in the science of econometrics. See generally J. JoHNsoN, Eco-
NOMETIC METHODS (1963).
21 In the first portion of the formula [1-T/2] the tax rate is divided by
2 since capital gains profits are taxed at half the ordinary income tax
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By multipying both sides of this equation by (l+r), the following
equation evolves:
(l+r) x=[1-t/2] . [p (r) (l+r) + p (r) (1+r) 2 + p (r)
(1+r) N]
Subtracting the second equation from the first yields
x--[l-t/2] [p (1+r)N-p]
This equation indicates exactly what the after-tax profit is for a
particular investment given certain variables: tax rate; average in-
vestment return; amount of investment. However, in order for this
to provide any insight into the theories previously expounded, a
second formula must be derived for the proposed new tax on capital
gains. It would develop as follows:
x-p (l-t) [ (l+r) N - (l+f) N] + p [l+f) N - 1]
Through illustrations, we can see how the proposed tax law
change will effect the taxpayer. Suppose one invests $10,000 in
common stock at eight percent return and inflation is at four percent
for a period of five years. By substituting into the first formula and
assuming a tax bracket of seventy-eight percent (including state
and local taxes), we can arrive at the net profit after taxes.
[---2 [10,000 (1.08)5 1 0,000]
=$2,863
Then to obtain net profits after taxes under our proposed tax law:
x=10,000 [-.78] [ (1.08) 5 - (1.04)15] + 10,000 [ (1.04) 5 -1]
=$2,724
rate. This quotient is then subtracted from one in order to reflect
after-tax profit in percentage form.
In the record portion of the formula, p (r) + p (r) (l+r) 14. .....
- (n) (l+r) N-, we arrive at total profit on investment principal
over (N) years. Thus p (r) represents the amount of profit realized
in the first year. In the second year we must compound investment
profit by increasing principal by the profit made in the first year -
p (r) - and then multiply by the rate of investment return. This
process is repeated over N number of years.
Hence after tax profit percentage [l-T/2] times total profit over
N years p(n) + p(r) (1+r)'4- ..... + p(r) (l+r)N-1, yields net
consumable profits after taxes (x).
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Thus in this hypothetical the taxpayer ends up with less net profit
under the proposed law because he has to pay more taxes ($139) .22
This would indicate that this method of handling gains will be no
friend to the investor-taxpayer, for his tax burden will most fre-
quently be higher than under the old law. But when basis adjusted
for inflation exceeds the sales price it will be an ordinary loss,
thereby providing some taxpayer relief and eliminating all those
recapture and hotchpot sections that have consistently produced
some confusion down through the years.
Assuming a four percent inflation one might wonder at what
point of investment return does the proposed tax law provide a
lesser tax for the investor. This answer can be obtained by setting
the two formulas to equal each other and solving for (r) investment
return.
(1-t/2) ([1+r]N--1) = (l-t) ([l+r]N)-[l+f]N) + [l+f]N-1
When solving for r, this algebraically reduces down to a single
equation:
r= (2 [1+f] -1) 1/'N -1
Substituting in the variables mentioned above you get the following
answer:
r=(2 [1.0415 -1)1/5 -1
22 Conversely, in a deflationary period, when the consumer index falls,
the real profit method of taxing gains on the sale of capital assets
would produce an even greater increase in tax burden. Consider an
asset purchase at $100, and held during a deflationary period of 20%
drop in the consumer index. If this asset is sold for $120, the present
gross monetary gain is $20 of which $10 (50% x $20) is taxable (pre-
suming long term treatment). Under our proposed method for taxa-
tion of "real profit," we reduce basis by the amount of inflation yielding
an adjusted basis in this example of $80 ($100 - 20% x $100). Sales price
less adjusted basis results in a taxable gain of $40 which is $30 more
than under present tax law.
Perhaps it is worth noting that many economists have theorized
that during times of depression it is important that government in-
crease taxation and spending in order to prevent stagnation of wealth.
As demonstrated above, a real profit approach would in fact be self-
adjusting, thus fortuitously facilitating sound fiscal policy. See, e.g.,
PECHMIAN, YIELD OF INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAx DURING A RECESSIQN,
PoLIclEs To COMBAT DEPREssIoNs (1960).
But one cannot help but be somewhat dismayed at the possibility
that an asset could be sold at its purchase price, yet still be taxed on a
real profit gain. This is a reality and can be better understood if ap-
proached in terms of exchange value rather than monetary value.
In other words, during deflation an asset's conversion value increases.
276 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 51, NO. 2 (1971)
This answer indicated that at seven and one-half percent return on
investment or above, the tax burden will be greater under the pro-
posed treatment of capital gains on investments. Note that if we
take the limit of (2 [1-F]N -1)1/' N -1 as N approaches infinity (r)
will approach F. This means that the longer an asset is held, the
lower the investment return has to be before the taxpayer has to
pay more taxes than he would have been liable for under old law.
Basically this change would offend the investor for he inevitably
would pay more taxes. But the homeowner who sells his house for
twice as much as he purchased it after holding it for 20 years
will most probably pay no taxes because his total gain would likely
be attributable only to inflation. This proposal, if enacted, would
almost certainly cause the wealthy financiers to jump out their
office windows. But this is the big loophole in federal taxation, and
as long as preferential treatment exists, those with the most power-
ful lobby in Congress will profit most. There are, however, sound
arguments for this special treatment to those who are willing to
invest their savings. It is said that we need to offer an incentive to
investors and an incentive for people to convert property or else
the flow of commerce will be impaired. These arguments may be
realistic, but they still offer no foundation for maintaining inequity
in the tax law. If policy dictates that investment incentive needs to
be spurred, then other programs to handle this problem should be
instituted. This method of facilitating governmental policy would,
as stated in Part II of this article, be more direct and flexible. There
certainly could not be any greater administrative and judicial cost
involved than is presently involved with administration of the
present tax law with its endless loopholes and complexity.
PART II
I. THE MAJOR PREvMsE
As pointed out in the introduction to this article, we now set out
to describe a simpler revenue code: one, though not devoid of any
and all fiscal and social policies, in which such policies are sub-
stantially reduced to minimal levels.
But first let us turn to our major premise once again. Why, in-
deed, eliminate provisions from the statute which delineate and
implement policies which are not in nature purely related to taxa-
tion? That is, what is wrong with the implementation of fiscal and
social policy through tax legislation? The answers to such ques-
tions are numerous, but we list the reasons in full if for no other
reason than that what we are explaining is a major premise.
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1. Sound economic policy depends upon governmental influence
and control (at least to some extent depending upon one's political
persuasion). When these policies are placed into practical effect
through legislation, direct, non-tax laws are preferable. Results are
les's difficult to measure and future consequences easier to predict.
When such policies are enacted through tax legislation, the results
may be even contra the original legislative policy.
2. Code simplicity. The Internal Revenue Code is the one com-
mon thread which binds all business, large and small, together.
Businessmen, of necessity,23 must become, if not experts, at least
competent in the general area of income (and to a lesser extent,
excise) taxation. When other than business policies (that is, "pure
tax policy") are involved, the statute becomes unnecessarily com-
plicated resulting in lost economies both for the individual business
and, incidentally, the entire economy. While the businessman's
actions may be to reduce his taxes through his carrying out of a
desired social or fiscal goal, the end result may be a distortion of
economic goals and a net reduction in the "desired" results. Al-
though much of the remainder of this article will attempt to point
up specific examples in illustration of this principle, it may be
stated simply now: an attempt to implement social and fiscal
policies through tax legislation may in fact produce an end result
of anti-social (or anti-fiscal) policies.
3. In a less theoretical vein, a simpler code will require signifi-
cantly less administrative expense, thus, in all probability, increas-
ing total revenues available for use outside the Treasury Depart-
ment (after-collection dollars, if you will). Moreover, fewer mis-
takes, reduced possibility of fraud, less expenditures on tax plan-
ning and more on operations, will all result in higher collections
and lower priced (because of increased economies) goods and
services.
4. In addition to being less expensively and better administered,
a simpler code would most certainly produce less litigation, fewer
mistakes and misunderstandings, and would not profit those who
could afford competent tax counsel while discriminating against
those who could not.
It may be argued, however, that the simplification of the tax
statute, while increasing social and fiscal legislation in other areas,
23 In the corporate area, for example, larger businesses pay over half
of their net profit to federal and state government. Thus, as far as
"spendable" dollars are concerned, knowledge of tax law may prove
to be as valuable as knowledge and expertise in operations.
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would at least diminish, if not negate, the value of the reasons set
out above. In other words, the Internal Revenue Code may be the
cheapest place from a source and application standpoint to legislate
on social and fiscal policy. Although there may be some validity
to this argument at least on the surface, in reality, with the mass
of government agencies already available, in operation and with
considerable expertise in the specific area legislated upon, there is
little question that administration would be better left to them.
Certainly the Treasury Department through the Internal Revenue
Service should not be responsible for the administration and execu-
tion of policies clearly beyond its legislative scope. Why should
an agency formed to collect monies and administer such collection
be responsible for the fiscal and social policy in so many areas?
Why indeed should this agency be able to legislate through promul-
gation of regulations, rulings and administrative adjudication in
areas totally without the revenue raising business of that depart-
ment? The implications of such concentration of power in one
governmental department--one portion of the executive branch-
are ominous. Moreover, the indirect method of controlling policies
not related to tax by our taxing agency leads to increased ineffi-
ciency throughout the other branches of government. Simply,
would it not be more economical (in the pure sense) to administer
housing programs through our housing agency, welfare programs
through welfare agencies and conservation programs through agen-
cies dealing with conservation? We submit that litigation in the
tax area (and probably on the whole) would decline, persons now
involved in tax work and planning for corporations and individuals
could be diverted into more socially productive areas, and what
planning and computations that remained would be directly in
relation to amount of real income and realistic business decisions.
II. ANTI-TAx POLICY
In order to illustrate the position set out above and to draw
these economic inefficiencies into clearer focus, we shall devote the
remainder of this article to a study of particular examples of social,
fiscal and other non-tax (and in fact anti-tax) policies within the
Internal Revenue Code, explaining why their inclusion is not desir-
able for the very policy standpoint from which their inclusion
resulted, and suggesting in at least simple terms how the same
policy may be effected by other legislation. Each of the provisions
has been either affected by or newly-enacted in the Tax Reform Act
of 1969, and it is with that statute we deal primarily. The provisions
examined are (1) personal exemptions, (2) low-moderate housing,
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(3) pollution facilities and coal mine safety equipment, and (4)
certain antitrust fines or penalties. It is also our purpose to ex-
amine by way of contrast particular sections of the Code which
should not be deleted since their purpose is purely one of tax
policy. These provisions include (1) income averaging, (2) involun-
tary conversions (and certain other non-recognition sections) and
(3) multiple corporations. Finally, we shall discuss briefly those
areas which, although not involving pure tax policy, accomplish
ends which are desired socially, and are at least not anti-tax in
nature. Such provisions include (1) deductions for charitable con-
tributions and (2) deductions for other taxes paid. We begin with
those provisions which, for the reasons outlined above, should not
be a part of the Internal Revenue Code.
A. Personal Exemptions
We begin with perhaps the simplest, most easily understood and
least-litigated sections of the Code which provide exemptions in
dollar amounts for each member of the family of the taxpayer when
certain support requirements are met. The congressional policy
behind the granting of such exemptions is beyond question to
provide tax relief through an exemption in direct proportion to the
size of the supported family.24 It is not our purpose in this article
to debate the pros and cons of such a policy (especially in these
days of increasing concern over population control) as this is not
our purpose throughout this article. What we do wish to illustrate
is that such a policy is in reality anti-tax in nature and should not
be a part of a revenue code. Certainly it can not be said that any
relation exists between real income and the allowances of such an
exemption. Assuming the validity of the congressional policy in
enacting (and recently increasing) these deductions from income in
relation to the size of one's family, we submit that there are more
efficient means of accomplishing this end (reduction of rates is one
obvious method) without distorting the true income picture.
B. Pollution Facilities and Coal Mine Safety Equipment
The 1969 Act introduced two new sections to the Code providing
items of tax preference which include the amortization of pollution
control facilities as well as the amortization of coal mine safety
equipment. 25 Although we deal here with the former, it is clear
24 However, due to the long-term inflationary effects present in the
economy (a problem dealt with at length in Part I, supra) the exemp-
tion has been reduced to a mere token, resulting in a "policy" devoid
of substance.
25 Tax Reform Act of 1969, § 301; 1954 CoDE §§ 57, 169, 187.
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that neither provision has any tax policy foundation, but rather one
in which the policy is social or business-related in nature.
New Section 169 of the 1954 Code allows an individual or corpo-
ration to amortize the cost of any "pollution control facility" over
a five-year period, receiving appropriate deductions for such amorti-
zation in each of the five years. In addition, section 179 still allows
additional first-year depreciation. In effect, then, for a facility with
a useful life of fifteen years 26 or less, a deduction is allowed for each
month equal to an amount computed by dividing the adjusted basis
by the number of months remaining. This deduction is available
only to those facilities which qualify. Generally, these are plants
or devices which serve to: "[A]bate or control water or atmo-
spheric pollution or contamination by removing, altering, disposing,
or storing of pollutants, contaminants, wastes, or heat .... 27
In addition, in order to qualify, such facility must be "certified" by
both a state and federal certiflying authority; for example, in the
case of air pollution, the state authority is the agency as defined in
the Clean Air Act, and the federal authority is the Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare. Certification means that the facility
conforms with the requirements of the state program regarding
abatement of water or air pollution. Moreover, the federal authority
is in compliance with applicable regulations of federal agencies and
is "in furtherance of the general policy of the United States ...
and ... atmospheric pollution ... ."28
Reference to the Senate Finance Committee Report outlines the
rationale for the enactment of such a bill.
The committee recognizes that an important challenge facing our
Nation today is the problem of environmental pollution.
In effect, private industry is being asked to make an investment
which in part is for the benefit of the general public.29
It is at this point we must depart from congressional reasoning.
That is, if we are to ask industry to "clean up," are there not better
direct methods available? The committee goes on to say:
The Committee recognizes that the incentive provided in the bill
is not a complete answer to the pollution problem. The need for
broader and more effective pollution control standards remains.
26 Special rules apply to facilities with greater than 15 year useful lives.
1954 CODE § 169 (f) (2).
27 1954 CODE § 169 (d) (1).
28 1954 CODE § 169 (d) (1) (B).
29 S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong. 1st Sess. 248 (1969).
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The amortization deduction provided by the bill, however, should
be a useful component of the Nation's total efforts to deal with
the pollution problem.3 0
But here is a perfect example of Treasury control and authority
exactly where it should not be. The Act incorporates by reference
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act and the Clean Air Act and
defines "authority" as both the Secretary of the Interior and the
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare.31 Our question is
merely why should not the government's "total efforts" be con-
centrated in these departments (or one of them) instead of over-
lapping into the taxing and revenue collecting arm? Is not concen-
tration of effort usually more efficient and economical? Are not
other incentives (such as technical assistance or direct subsidy)
more productive and less counter-productive?
We submit that they are. To place provisions such as these in
the Internal Revenue Code is to not only ask for confusion and
fewer economies, but also to allow the Treasury to begin to
"legislate" in areas where it has neither the expertise nor the
authority. One final point must be made clear. No issue is being
taken with the basic policy of pollution control (or for that matter
with any of the policies discussed hereafter). The issue is not
"what" but "how."
C. Rollover for Low-Income Housing
As anyone who deals even remotely in real estate well knows
by this late date, the 1969 Act provides for non-recognition (or de-
ferred recognition if you will) of gains realized on the sale of
certain federally subsidized or assisted housing programs. Briefly,
in order to qualify one must make an approved disposition, that is o
one to the tenant or tax-exempt managing authority, and the proj-
ect must be one the mortgage on which is insured under Sections
221 (d) (3) or 236 of the National Housing Act. The non-recognition
provision is similar to that of other non-recognition provisions of
the Code: the gain will be recognized only to the extent that the
proceeds are not reinvested in other low-income housing projects
within a one-year period. In addition, Section 167 of the Code
allows accelerated depreciation on such property. Certainly it was
Congress' purpose in passing upon these provisions to encourage
investors in low-income housing. Again, looking at the Senate Com-
mittee Report:
30 Id. at 249 (emphasis added).
31 Section 187 of the Code allowing amortization of certain coal mine
safety equipment is an almost identical provision with the Federal
Coal Mine Health & Safety Act incorporated and with certification
approved by the Secretary of the Interior.
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By providing that no gain is to be recognized in these cases, it
would be impossible to decrease the sales price to the occupants
or tax-exempt organizations managing these properties. The Com-
mittee believes this result would be desirable. This should enable
them to make purchases they otherwise could not make.32
It would seem that there would be available many other more
direct, more easily administered, and more efficient means for
achieving the legislative policy of enabling low-income families "to
make purchases they otherwise could not make." Here again, the
availability of direct subsidy, mortgage insurance, etc. are more
desirable than the incursion upon the revenue act in the form of
low-income housing tax breaks. Surely the total economic effect
cannot be completed as easily, nor can the input on the model
economic structure be arrived at without considerable more diffi-
culty than through the use of more direct means. Although no
concrete figures are available, the effect upon revenue generated for
the federal government's use will in all likelihood be increased.
This is simply because of lower administrative cost in collection
and, more importantly, increased economies result in larger actual
income subject to taxation.
At this point in our discussion, let us pause for a moment to
reflect upon the general purpose of the article. We interject this
thought again since it becomes especially apparent during the dis-
cussion of the low-income housing rollover provisions outlined above
that what is proposed throughout this article is the payment of taxes
only upon real income33 received or accrued to the taxpayer. The
low-income housing incentives must be made available. Although
it may be argued that in the case of the deferred recognition provi-
sions no tax is foregone, but its collection merely delayed, it is our
contention that real income will not be reflected. This provision
substantially differs from other non-recognition sections in policy
and consequent reflection of real income.34
D. Antitrust Transactions
Our discussion concerning the "new" provisions of the law in
this area relates not only to antitrust transactions, but also to all
provisions which disallow deductions for illegal, discouraged or
32 S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 292 (1969) (emphasis added).
33 As defined in Part 1.
34 See the discussion of the "pure tax policy" involved in 1954 CODE
§ 1033 (Involuntary Conversions) p. 285 infra.
THE TAXATION OF "REAL PROFIT"
political activities. Because of the simplicity of the antitrust-related
sections of the Code, we shall confine our discussion to them. It
must be kept in mind, however, that similar issues arise when con-
sidering political expenditures for business reasons, disallowance of
deductions for bribery of officials, and the denial of all deductions
of certain payments deemed "against public policy."
Section 162 of the 1954 Code allows deductions for all "ordinary
and necessary" business expenses. This is in conformity with our
real income proposals outlined in Part I, viz., all expenditures made
in the course of business in order to produce income should be fully
deductible in computing real income. Problems arise, however,
when certain payments are made in the ordinary course of business
but the making of these expenditures is not favored socially
or politically. For example, Section 4 of the Clayton Antitrust Act 35
provides that one injured by antitrust violations may recover dam-
ages in an amount equal to three times the economic loss sustained.
The Internal Revenue Service had allowed as a deduction the full
amount paid or payable by the offending person or organization.36
Section 162 of the 1954 Code was amended by the 1969 Tax Reform
Act in such a manner as to eliminate any deduction for two-thirds
of any amount incurred by reason of conviction under the Antitrust
Laws. Thus the amount paid in actual damages is allowed as a
deduction, but that amount awarded as punitive damages may not
be deducted by the offending taxpayer. The announced congres-
sional policy upon which the enactment of this provision rests is
succinctly stated in the Senate Report. In so doing the Report states
the problem as one dual in nature--concerning tax policy and anti-
trust policy-a problem which cannot arise if a pure tax policy code
can be developed.
The question as to whether antitrust treble damage payments
should be deductible must be viewed both from the standpoint of
antitrust policy and from the standpoint of tax policy. From the
standpoint of antitrust policy, the basic issues are the extent of
the penalties intended and whether their impact should be re-
duced by permitting them to reduce taxes which otherwise have to
be paid.37
The question then becomes whether the expense so incurred can
be termed one which is "ordinary and necessary." This is the issue
reached in a similar case before the Supreme Court.38 In that case,
35 15 U.S.C. §§ 12, 13, 14-27 (1963).
36 Rev. Rul. 64-224, 1964-2 Cum. BuLL. 52.
37 S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 273 (1969).
38 Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U. S. 30 (1958).
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the Court weighed both policies and decided in favor of the disal-
lowance of the deduction in order not to "encourage violation of
declared public policy."'39 It must be recalled, however, that inser-
tion into the Internal Revenue Code of such a provision does not
allow the tax to be paid on actual income received or accrued. It
cannot be denied that the expenditure was made in the course of
business. Certainly it is not our desire to encourage such violations
of the law by allowing these deductions. It is merely our contention
that whatever discouragement that is needed in the antitrust area
should be supplied by antitrust laws based on rationalized antitrust
policies. Otherwise, priorities become distorted, issues blend and
injustices result.
III. PURE TAX POLICY
At this point we turn our attention to a brief examination of
several provisions of the Code which reflect what we have previ-
ously termed "pure tax policy." These provisions are concerned
entirely with the equitable levy of taxes, not with fiscal and social
policy totally without the ambit of the Treasury's limited jurisdic-
tion.
A. Income Averaging
Because of the very nature of the progressive system of income
taxation (which we accept as equitable), inequities result when
income is "bunched" into single tax years. Thus one who receives
equal portions of income over a five year period pays substantially
less tax than one who receives the entire amount in a single year
due to the fact that the tax will be levied at higher rates. A system
which allows the taxpayer to "average" his income over an aug-
mented time period receives relief from the higher tax rates. Such
a system has been a part of the Code for many years.40 The 1969
Reform Act was the most recent in a series of steps which have
resulted in more liberal treatment under the income averaging pro-
visions, viz., capital, gains, wagering income, and prizes are now in-
cluded as averagable income.
The income averaging sections of the Code are concerned with
the equitable treatment of taxpayers. In order that the man who
receives his income in one year (due to the use of a cash accounting
system, contingency fees or occupation, i.e., inventor, artist, etc.)
will not be penalized simply because of this fact, these sections
were enacted. Discrimination among equally paid (over the long
39 Id. at 35.
40 1954 CODE §§ 1301-04.
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run) taxpayers is substantiall reduced. Thus a tax policy was
implemented and real income is still reflected. Unnecessary compli-
cations are not introduced. Confusion of issues is diminished.
B. Involuntary Conversions
Section 1033 of the 1954 Code provides that upon destruction or
seizure under condemnation of property owned by the taxpayer,
no gain will be recognized if the proceeds from such involuntary
conversion are reinvested in similar property within a specified time
limit. The policy behind such a provision is evident: due to the
liquidity problem involved, one whose property was converted
through no act of his own (without planning) into cash and who
reinvested the amount received would have little chance to raise
the money required for payment of taxes. Moreover, because he
had no opportunity for advance tax planning, such as involun-
tary sale or conversion may unfairly affect his business plans. Thus,
the non-recognition (or delayed recognition) section was enacted.
Here again, a pure tax policy is illustrated. Such a provision
was not made a part of the Code in order to encourage reinvestment
in certain types of property (as was the low-income housing rollover
provision), but rather was to give taxpayer relief when inequities
were realized. Such provisions are a discrimination against persons
in similar economic and income situations. They do not proceed
into areas controlled by other policies.
C. Multiple Corporations
Although several rather complicated provisions relate to multiple
corporations,41 the general policy (recently strengthened by the
1969 Act) behind their enactment was the prevention of the abuse
of the below $25,000 income tax rate allowed for each corporation.
By incorporating each division separately a $6500 tax savings per
annum per corporation was realized since the forty-eight percent
surtax on income over $25,000 to each division. The multiple corpo-
ration provision dissuades such abuse, and after 1975, it will do away
with it altogether. Clearly, a tax policy alone is implemented. No at-
tempt is made to discourage (or to encourage) corporate develop-
ment, or capital investment in certain equipment or other property,
and, in addition, the tax is levied equitably among corporate tax-
payers. Through a mere change in form, a business cannot achieve
more favorable tax treatment. Thus tax is paid on real income for
the total entity. Both objects of true tax policy are satisfied.
41 1954 CODE § § 1561-63.
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IV. NON-TAx POLICY
As previously mentioned above, we lastly set forth for consi-
deration those portions of the Code which, though not expressly
anti-tax in nature, do not fall within the ambit of pure tax policy.
Such provisions provide for socially desirable ends but, more im-
portantly (at least in this discussion), provide equity in real income
taxation. Such provisions include many of the so-called "itemized
deductions" and are primarily applicable to individual income taxa-
tion. We shall briefly discuss one of these provisions.
Under Section 170 of the 1954 Code donations to charitable
organizations are deductible (to a limited extent) from gross in-
come. There is little question as to what policy lies behind this
section: an incentive is provided for taxpayers to contribute to
charities who receive virtually all of their support from private
sources. Because of the progressive system of taxation, the incen-
tive is a strong one. A moderate gift to charity may lower the
taxpayer's tax bracket enough so that the tax savings are substan-
tiall yincreased-enough so that the net after-tax income is greater
than it would have been had no such contribution (and consequent
deduction) been made.
Here it may be argued that such a provision has no.place in a
revenue code based upon taxation of real income, and thus should
be eliminated. But this is not the case. Although the provision was
enacted primarily for social policy purposes, it must remain a part
of the Code. The reason is clear: there are no alternative plans
available which would provide revenue for these organizations
without going to the extreme measure of governmental fiscal influ-
ence in every charity. Such a provision (at least as far as churches
and other religious organizations are concerned) is clearly uncon-
stitutional. Moreover, real income, although distorted, may be
computed and lower rates applied-which is simply a different way
of allowing the deduction.
The charitable contribution example shows beyond a doubt that
there are limitations upon using pure tax theory and the real in-
come model for income tax computation. However, such provisions
can be readily ascertained and exemptions made. Though the
reader may question our use of exemptions at this point, when we
have insisted upon an essentially exception-free, simplified code,
may we say that perfection has not been a goal in formulating such
a statute. Rather, it is our contention that a simpler and more
rational code may be drawn and adopted if specific limitations are
recognized and dealt with.
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Finally, let us point out that each and every section of the Code
is not so easily categorized as those we have chosen to review.
However, it must be noted that when new revisions are considered,
indeed, when a thorough revamping of the Act comes, consideration
must be given to analysis of the type of policies involved. Those
policies which can be categorized as anti-tax should be deleted and
other solutions sought, implemented through more appropriate de-
partments of government. Only then will a more understandable,
economically sound internal revenue system be achieved.
A FINAL REMARK
We have based this article on the major premise that the pri-
mary congressional purpose of our internal revenue system is to
raise monies for government use in defense, public welfare, devel-
opment for the public good, etc. Should we deem this primary
purpose as one of redistribution of wealth or monetary-fiscal control
of the economic system, we daresay much of our thesis would be
invalid. We must make clear, however, that we are speaking of the
primary, underlying purpose-not incidental purposes.
With this major premise always foremost in our minds, we have
attempted to develop the bases for a revenue code geared to the
accomplishment of this premise. As we have pointed out, our new
code would not be totally devoid of all social and fiscal policy.
However, we believe the elimination of much of the statute devoted
to the implementation of these policies would result in higher
revenues and consequent improved economies. The recognition in
the act of the reality of inflation (or deflation), which is necessarily
present when a monetary (as opposed to barter) system is used, is
long overdue. Moreover, the preferences accorded capital gains
throughout the Code are dysfunctional. By taxing "real" profit and
eliminating virtually all of the social policies from an internal
revenue act, we believe a functional system can be developed.
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APPENDIX A
Comparison of Depreciation Deductions, Initial and Investment Allowances a
for Industrial Equipment, Leading Industrial Countries and United States
Depreciation deductions, initial and
Representa- investment allowances (percentage
tive tax of cost of asset)
lives
Country (years) 1st year 1st 2 years 1st 5 years
Belgium
Canada
France
West Germany
Italy
Japan
Netherlands
Sweden
United Kingdom
Average, 9 foreign countries
United States:
Practice prior to July 11, 1962
With new depreciation guidelines
With new depreciation guidelines
and investment credit"
8 22.5
10 30.0
10 25.0
10 20.0
10 25.0
16 43.4
10 26.2
5 30.0
27 39.0
29.0
15 13.3
12 16.7
12 29.5
Chart from, TAX FOUNDATION INC., DEPRECIATION ALLOWANCE FEDERAL TAX
POLICY AND SOME EcONoMnc ASPECTS.
92.5
71.4
76.3
67.2
100.0
68.2
85.6
100.0
64.0
80.6
51.1
59.8
69.6
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